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Abstract 
The accuracy of budget estimates is vital in ensuring cost efficiency and decreasing the 
possibility of budget and schedule growth. The goal of this study was to determine when budget 
estimates increase and what may cause those increases. Percent schedule and linear interpolation 
was used to analyze the budget changes. Space program budget growth does not increase at a 
constant rate between Milestone B (MS B) and Initial Operational Capability (IOC). When an 
exponential curve was fit to the deviations in budget growth, the mean and median R2 for the 
programs in this study were .83 and .91, respectively. Many programs had negative annual 
budget growth in the first one or two fiscal years of their schedule, this even included large 
satellite programs with substantial budget growth later in their schedules. Much of the 
cumulative % budget growth was also in the later fiscal years of the schedule between MS B and 
IOC. The mean and median of cumulative % budget growth change at the 90% to 100% schedule 
mark are 25.30% and 22.51% than while they are only 7.12% and 0.96% at the 30% to 40% 
schedule mark. The original objective, to determine how close previous fiscal year budget 
estimates are to the actual budget, was also achieved. This accuracy has increased in recent years 
as well. As a program nears a specific fiscal year, the mean difference in the estimate to actual 
decreases from 42.3% four years out to 15.9% one year out. A confidence interval can also be 
created for these differences. At four years out, there is 95% confidence that the budget estimate 
is between 38.2% and 51.3% of the actual budget, and, at one year out, there is 95% confidence 
that the budget estimate is between 8% and 21.6% of the actual budget. 
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I. Introduction 
Background 
Space is becoming increasingly more important for defense. There has been much growth 
and change in the space realm in recent decades, ultimately culminating in the proposed creation 
of a new military branch specifically for space by 2022, first officially suggested by President 
Trump in March of 2018 (Koren, 2018). However, behind all of this growth is a history of 
ballooning costs, schedule overruns, and fragmented leadership (Chaplain, 2017). Throughout 
the life cycle of a space program, expected costs tend to change significantly from those at initial 
project conception and there are many issues that may plague the program, increase the cost, and 
delay the schedule. To help provide reliable cost and schedule estimates and decrease the 
difference between those and the actual costs and schedule, analysis and estimating techniques 
are utilized through the life cycle of a program. 
These issues are not specific to space acquisition. Research even dating back to the 1950s 
(Younossi, 2007) reveals extreme problems for cost analysis for DoD weapons systems. In 1959, 
Marshall and Meckling provide two aspects that create inaccurate estimates: First such estimates 
are “biased” toward over-optimism. Second, aside from the bias, the errors in the estimate 
evidence a substantial variation. Younossi also showed that development growth in the 1970s – 
1990s remained high with no significant improvement, despite multiple acquisition reforms and 
management initiatives. 
Belcher and Dukovich (1999) introduced 12 different, specific aspects which contribute 
to Research and Development (R&D) costs. Unger (2001) illustrated that funding constraints 
explained 53.4% of the cost overrun and 50.5% of schedule slippage. He estimated a relationship 
2 
 
between initial budget profile and schedule slippage and cost overruns. Even though we do not 
look at budget profiles in this study, we estimate a similar relationship comparing the estimated 
R&D costs to the actual costs. This can identify potential factors, such as the ones illustrated in 
Figure 1 from Belcher and Dukovich (1999), which explain the difference and may be causing 
similar schedule slippages, cost overruns, and any trends in the Space acquisition programs as 
well.  
 
Figure 1: Factors Contributing to Development Costs 
This research, however, looks specifically into space acquisition Research, Development, 
Training & Evaluation (RDT&E) costs. There have been many studies analyzing cost increases 
in weapons systems, a few looking specifically Air Force and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) space systems’ RDT&E costs. In Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) (1992) analyzed 29 NASA projects with at least $200 million in development costs and 
reported that 25 of them experienced a median cost growth 77 percent and GAO (2004) found of 
27 development space projects, over half experienced cost growth, some as much as 94%. 
The schedule performance of the NASA portfolio of major projects has deteriorated as 
shown in Figure 2, but the extent of cost performance deterioration is unknown. The average 
launch delay for the portfolio in 2018 was 12 months, the highest delay GAO has reported in its 
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10 years of assessing major NASA projects and up from less than 4 months in 2017 (GAO, 
2018).  
 
 
Figure 2: NASA Major Project Portfolio Cost & Schedule Performance Deteriorated 2018 
These issues are not just limited to NASA and phasing of estimates continues to present 
challenges in recent years. Space & Missiles Systems Center (SMC) often finds itself identifying 
portfolio re-phasing candidates for SAF/AQXE (Office of the Deputy Asst Secy for Acquisition 
Integration, Execution Oversight) and SAF/FMBI (Budget Investment) where funding is early to 
need or, to a lesser degree, unfunded requirements (UFRs) baseline target review (BTR) 
candidates for shortfalls. 
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Problem Statement 
There are three specifics goals for this study. First, to determine if the budget deviations 
are constant or vary over time. Many acquisition programs are delayed and over budget. 
Determining what is associated with these deviations may help prevent them in the future. Next, 
we address at what point in the program the largest deviations occur. Lastly, we determine if 
there any specific factors that are present in multiple programs that are associated with the 
deviations. Additionally, historic estimates at major Milestone B (MS B) and Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) milestones need to be reviewed to see what the recommended phasing was at 
the time as well as program actual cost at completion. This also shows how much of the total 
budget is spent at differents point in the schedule.  To meet these objectives, we next present our 
research questions that form the foundation for our research. 
Research Objectives 
1. Does a linear or exponential function best reflect how RDT&E budget changes as a 
space program progresses through its schedule? 
2. When do those budget estimates actually change and what are associated with those 
changes? 
3. Do actual RDT&E budgets following the 60/45 rule when looking at the time 
between MS B and IOC? 
4. As estimates get closer to actual budgets, how much do these differ? 
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Research Approach 
The identification of data and methodology for this study consisted of multiple sources, 
which includes Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE), Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) 
data from Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) System, and 
multiple spreadsheets from Life Cycle Management Center (LCMC). CADE is a conglomerate 
of tools used by DoD to support cost and earned value data analysis. A SAR is a summary of a 
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Acquisition Category (ACAT) I program. Most of 
the data used came from SAR data and verified using a new CADE SAR database and LCMC 
spreadsheets. 
Way Ahead 
Current acquisition policy emphasizes the importance of developing an accurate point 
estimate. Through the following research, we aim to identify and explain the difference between 
the estimate and actual budgets. In Chapter 2, prior research concerning this topic is discussed. 
Chapter 3 reviews how we collected our data, what is currently being used, and the proposed 
methodology for analyzing space program budget deviations. Chapter 4 illustrates our results. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes this study, its results, and potential future research on this topic.  
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter describes the methods of time phasing, topics and previous findings of time-
phasing studies from the Air Force, DoD, and NASA, and previous studies on weapon system 
cost factors and cost growth. There are multiple methods to time-phase programs: 
schedule/milestone, analogy, and S-curve (Department of the Air Force, 2007). Estimating an 
appropriate funding profile for development programs is critical to their financial success. 
Inefficiently funded programs can either consume funding needed elsewhere, or cause program 
management crises in the form of funding shortfalls. In the absence of a standard model to 
establish development program costs, theorists developed mathematical models to derive the 
appropriate development funding profiles.  
Cost of development is tied to the process itself. Development can include system 
requirements review, preliminary design review, critical design review, software coding, system 
tests, etc. Even for multi-year funding of development funds, one must still look at incremental 
funding. It is available for a period of two years but still must be allocated by fiscal year (FY). 
One of the largest issues that create cost and schedule growth is due to budgets [that did] 
not match the work expected to be accomplished (NASA, 2015). Since budget constraints may 
limit what can be accomplished in a given fiscal year, the different phases of the program may be 
delayed, increasing the overall cost and timeframe of development. 
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Methods of Time Phasing 
The three types of methods of time-phasing we go further into are schedule/milestone, 
analogy, and the S-curve. Determining which method to use depends on information availability 
of the program as well as information availability of historically analogous programs.  
The next couple of paragraphs borrow heavily from AFCAH, 2007 and NASA CEH, 
2015. The Schedule/Milestone approach is the most exact but also most difficult method to use 
to spread development estimates, since it requires a detailed program schedule (which may not 
be available) of milestones and uses this to allocate costs to appropriate fiscal years. One must 
determine the milestones, time-phase those milestones based on the program schedule, estimate 
the percent of the total cost required to complete each milestone, and then allocate the cost to 
appropriate fiscal years. 
The next method, analogy, uses information from a previous program similar to the 
current one being estimated. The old and new programs should be similar with respect to the 
scheduling of their key milestones as well as the length of their development period. For 
example, a program which requires 18 months of design effort prior to RDT&E may have 
significantly different funding requirements than one with a three year design effort. Similarly, a 
program with concurrency and advance procurement is not a good analogy for the time phasing 
of an estimate for a program without these features. 
The last type of time phasing, and the often preferred for RDT&E, is S-curve. A typical 
distribution (Rayleigh, Weibull, or Beta) illustrates the percentage spent and the elapsed time 
between two points in time. By way of illustrating the concept, if an analyst has developed an 
estimate of $100 million for a satellite, without any other knowledge of funding needs, the 
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analyst could use the rule of thumb that assumes a 60:40 Beta Curve (60 percent of the cost at 
the halfway mark and 40 percent for the remainder of the project). A 60/45 Beta curve is 
currently utilized at SMC to adjust for risk for top level phasing Curve (60 percent of the cost at 
the 45% point). Table 1 illustrates the phasing implementation process. 
Table 1: SMC Phasing Implementation Process 
 
Steps 
 
1. Generate risk adjusted estimate at desired BY (Base-Year) and confidence level 
 
2. Apply 60/45 Beta curve to BY risk adjusted estimate to get annual phased expenditures (BY) 
 
3. Convert BY$ to TY$ (Then-Year) using the appropriate Raw Index 
Calculate phased cumulative TY expenditures over time 
 
4. Calculate %OCTL (Open Commitment plus Termination Liability) using %Time 
a. Apply %OCTL to phased cumulative TY expenditures to calculate the cumulative OCTL 
dollars (TY) 
b. Apply credit and debit to calculate annual OCTL dollar adjustment 
 
5. Add annual Expenditures (TY) to annual OCTL adjustment (TY) for Final Budget Profile  
 
 
SMC currently utilizes a type of Constructive Systems Engineering Cost Model 
(COSYSMO) called the Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model (USCM). COSYSMO is a unique 
cost model as it was created for space systems in that the model elements are mapped for space 
systems’ WBS’s and phases are mapped according to the National Security Space (NSS) 
acquisition policy. USCM is a parametric model that provides linear and nonlinear Cost 
Estimating Relationships (CERs) to estimate the costs of satellite development and production. 
Eleven USCM CERs describe bus and communication payload costs, as well as their associated 
system engineering; program management; and integration, assembly, and test costs. The model 
includes all satellite buses, but focuses on communication satellite payloads. Non-
communication satellite data points are primarily used for their platform/bus costs, and their 
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associated payload costs are captured in the database but not used for CER development. The 
majority of the costs included in USCM are end-of-program actual costs. SMC published the 
first USCM edition in 1969. Since that time, it has gone through seven iterations. The USCM 
database, currently in its eighth version, includes 12 NASA, 22 military, and 12 commercial 
programs in its data repository. Of interest in this paper is the WBS assumed in the model, 
particularly the systems engineering activities as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: USCM WBS 
1 Space Vehicle 1.3 Communications Payload 
1.1 Integration, Assembly, & System Test   1.3.1 Transmitter 
1.2 Spacecraft   1.3.2 Receiver/Exciter 
 1.2.1 Structure, Interstage/Adapter   1.3.3 Transponder 
 1.2.2 Thermal Control   1.3.4 Digital Electronics 
 1.2.3 Attitude Determination Control System   1.3.5 Analog Electronics 
  1.2.3.1 Attitude Determination   1.3.6 Antennas 
  1.2.3.2 Reaction Control System   1.3.7 RF Distribution 
 1.2.4 Electrical Power Supply 1.4 Program-Level 
  1.2.4.1 Power Generation   1.4.1 Program Management 
  1.2.4.2 Power Storage   1.4.2 Systems Engineering 
  1.2.4.3 Power Conditioning and Distribution   1.4.3 Data 
 1.2.5 Telemetry, Tracking, and Command 2 Aerospace Ground Equipment 
  1.2.5.1 Transmitter 3 Launch and Orbital Operations 
  1.2.5.2 Receiver/Exciter   
   
  1.2.5.3 Transponder   
   
  1.2.5.4 Digital Electronics   
   
  1.2.5.5 Analog Electronics   
   
  1.2.5.6 Antennas   
   
    1.2.5.7 RF Distribution       
 
Space System Life Cycle Phases 
The National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-016, shown in Figure 3, highlights 
the key guidelines and processes associated with the acquisition of DoD space systems (National 
Security Space Acquisition Policy 2004). Many acquisitions, DoD and elsewhere, focus on high 
quantity programs, but most space programs are different as they are low quantity, much higher 
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technically complex programs. Since these programs have smaller quantities, more emphasis is 
placed on development and launch capabilities instead of operation and support (O&S). 
 
Figure 3: Acquisition Phases 
 
Time Phasing Research 
After briefly discussing how a space program’s budget profile is created, we now briefly 
discuss findings from a couple of studies which analyzed actual development budgets. Brown 
(2015) tested if the “rule of thumb” of 60 percent of expenditures occur at halfway of the 
program’s development schedule and, for aircraft development models, which distribution 
provides the best S-curve model. He found that the application of the 60/40 rule for aircraft is 
limited since it does not account for difference in the time phasing of programs. He determined 
that the time to first flight, length of development, and upgrade were all significant for 
estimation. He concluded that the Weibull distribution is slightly more accurate that the other 
two models. The Weibull model explained 74.6 percent of variation and the Rayleigh and Beta 
models explained 73.7 percent and 69.9 percent of variation, respectively, while the 60/40 rule 
explained only 68 percent of variation.  
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Burgess (2006) simultaneously tests the Rayleigh, Weibull, and Beta distributions. He 
sued 3 steps: (1) Estimating time from contract award to launch; (2) developing a time-phased 
expenditure profile; and (3) converting cost to budget. The researched concluded that there is a 
fixed-cost component to development programs as well, especially for long programs where 
launch slips and integration delays arise after most development work is complete. His results 
show that the Weibull distribution outperforms both the Rayleigh and Beta distributions in fitting 
expenditure patterns for 26 DoD RDT&E space contracts (Burgess, 2006: 24-25). Further 
research was done working with 26 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and DoD space 
satellite systems. Burgess concluded that the Beta was more accurate than the Rayleigh and that 
the programs averaged 65% spent expenditures at 50% schedule, shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Data Points from Burgess Research 
 
Weapon System Cost Growth Research 
 
Now that we have described how estimates are created and some research on building 
models from actual budgets, we look into research pertaining to analyzing the differences 
between the estimates and actuals. There has been much research on causes of cost growth in 
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weapon systems since the 1960s. However, few have found consistent causes of that growth 
across multiple programs, which is one of our goals in this research. According to Younossi 
(2008), who looked at SAR reports from the 1960s through the 2000s, there has been a 46% 
average cost growth factor for completed Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). This 
study also revealed the underestimation of Space programs was larger than other weapon 
systems.  
Space program cost growth causes can be summarized into four general categories: 
contractor execution errors, work content changes, technology development difficulty, and 
integration difficulty (Kim, 2015). Many previous studies confirmed these results and interviews 
with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) were also not surprised by these findings. The purpose of 
this study was to accomplish the following: 
• Analyze the performance of selected DoD space programs in terms of cost 
growth, schedule delays, and satellite on-orbit performance. 
• Identify enterprise-level systemic issues and key factors that contributed to cost 
growth, schedule overrun, and technical problems in space acquisition. 
• Characterize the current status of the following programs: Advanced Extremely 
High Frequency (AEHF), Global Positioning System (GPS IIF), GPS III, Space-
Based Infrared System Hi (SBIRS HI), and Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) 
(all of which except GPS IIF is included in this research). 
• Identify future acquisition challenges that the next-generation space systems 
might face. 
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According to Leonard (2014), which researched 38 different programs, 8 of which being 
space, emphasized the statistically significant difference of cost growth between space programs 
and non-space programs. Table 3 displays the results, showing space development cost growth 
126 percent higher than that of non-space programs.  
Table 3: Average Cost Growth in Space and Non-Space programs (%) 
 Budgetary Cost Growth Unit Cost Growth 
Program Cat Development Procurement Total APUC PAUC 
Space 179 240 187 139 129 
Non-Space 53 48 50 40 41 
 
 Porter (2009) examined 11 programs with significant cost growth, including one of the 
programs we researched as well, SBIRS-HI. He identified two major causes of cost growth: 
weaknesses in management visibility, direction, and oversight, which included inappropriate 
policy implementation, reliance on unproven strategies, and poor contractor oversight, and 
weaknesses in initial program definition and costing, which included unstable requirement 
processes, use of immature technology, inefficient front-end analysis, and excessive schedule 
compression. We will reference some of these results of these programs in Chapter 4 as well as 
results from Younossi (2008), who also thoroughly researched GPS and again SBIRS-HI, when 
we dive into research of cost growth above our threshold.  
Summary 
 AFCAH provides three methods as discussed earlier to increase the accuracy of time 
phasing: schedule/milestone, analogy, and S-curve. The S-curve is preferred for development 
costs, and even more specifically, the Weibull and Beta distributions have become used more 
frequently after the previous research done as mentioned above.  
14 
 
Previous research mainly looked into different qualitative causes of cost growth in 
MDAPs as well as specifically in Space programs. In our methodology, explained in the next 
chapter, we explore more quantitative causes of cost growth from Milestone B (MS B) through 
the Initial Operational Capability (IOC), starting with fitting a curve of the overall change 
between estimated and actual budgets as well as investigating further into when those changes 
actually occurred and if there are any commonalities in what caused those changes.  
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III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
The previous chapter reviewed research on how estimates are created, curves created 
from actual budgets, and causes of cost deviation between the estimate and actual costs. As 
stated before, this study looks at that deviation quantitatively. In this chapter, we explain the data 
methods and the sources utilized to address the research questions in Chapter 1. We then explain 
how we normalized the data as well as standardized it into a percent schedule. Finally, we go 
into the three different specific analyses to address our research questions: 
1. Does a linear or exponential function best reflect how RDT&E budget changes as a 
space program progresses through its schedule? 
2. When do those budget estimates actually change and what are associated with those 
changes? 
3. Do actual RDT&E budgets following the 60/45 rule when looking at the time 
between MS B and IOC? 
4. As estimates get closer to actual budgets, how much do these differ? 
Data Source 
Previous S-curve researchers have used two different sources for their data: either Select 
Acquisition Reports (SAR) total obligation authority (TOA) or actual contractor cost reports’ 
expenditure data. For this research, we use SAR data. Through our exploration into the two 
different sources, we found that SAR data has been consistently more reliable than current 
contractor data, mainly when looking for estimated costs for programs through the Automated 
Cost Estimating Integrated Tools program (ACE-IT). We were not able to confirm what 
16 
 
percentage of the RDT&E costs were represented on these reports as well as how to match them 
up with the coordinated actual costs for the same program.  
Also, SAR data is consistently available and updated. According to Title 10 USC § 2432 
“Selected Acquisition Reports”, SAR reports are reported annually and include budgeted TOA 
amounts as well as actual costs amounts for every fiscal year of RDT&E. These yearly reports 
were crucial in determining not only the overall RDT&E cost growth, but also the analysis of the 
cost growth per year. Also, a new CADE SAR database as well as LCMC reports were used to 
verify information. 
Data Selection 
From those three data sources, we were able to gather the required data on eleven 
programs for the first two parts of the research and data on a twelfth program, GPS UE, which 
was missing a planned IOC date, was included in the inferential part of our analysis. The number 
of programs we could select was determined by what different information was available. For 
part of this research, we required each program have a reported engineering and manufacturing 
development (EMD) contract date (coinciding with Milestone B) and an IOC date. The program 
criteria list is in Table 4 and all included programs are in Table 5, of which 11 of the 12 
programs are Air Force and 8 of the 12 are satellites. Also, we needed enough SAR data between 
those two dates to use in the yearly analysis. For the older programs, the new CADE SAR data 
tool, still in beta status, was very useful in filling in those gaps.  
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Table 4: Program Inclusion Criteria 
Program Inclusion Criteria Number of Programs 
Space Programs listed in DAMIR 40 
No Schedule Data Unavailable -15 
Cancelled/Failed Programs -2 
Could Not Separate Subprograms/Duplicates -5 
IOC has not Occurred yet -3 
Not all SARs Available between MS B & IOC -3 
Programs Available 12 
 
 
Table 5: Included Programs 
Program Service Weapon Type MS B – act IOC – pln IOC – act 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Air Force Satellite 1-Nov-01 1-Nov-07 1-Jul-15 
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) III Air Force Satellite 1-Feb-77 1-Mar-82 1-Mar-82 
Defense Support Program (DSP) Air Force Satellite 1-Jul-81 1-Jan-87 1-Dec-88 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Air Force Launch Vehicle 16-Oct-98 1-Dec-01 1-Aug-02 
Enhanced Polar System (EPS) Air Force Space 1-Apr-14 1-Jun-18 1-Jun-18 
Global Positioning System (GPS) Blk IIR Air Force Satellite 1-Jun-89 1-Oct-95 1-Aug-96 
Global Positioning System (GPS) III Air Force Satellite 15-May-08 1-Apr-14 1-Aug-16 
Global Positioning System User Equipment (GPS UE) Air Force Electronic 1-Jul-79 Unavailable 1-Jul-88 
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) Navy Satellite 24-Sep-04 1-Mar-10 30-Dec-11 
Space-Based Infrared System Hi (SBIRS HI) Air Force Satellite 1-Nov-96 1-Sep-01 1-Aug-04 
Space Fence Air Force Space 2-Jun-14 1-Jul-19 1-Oct-18 
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) Air Force Satellite 1-Jan-01 1-Dec-04 26-Jan-09 
 
CADE SAR Database 
The objective of the CADE SAR database is to: provide a relational, authoritative 
database hosted on CADE, generate reports via a user interface, and provide download 
functionality. The database includes all known, available SAR data from:  
• Authoritative data from DAMIR (PM-submitted data via DAMIR’s automated submit 
function);  
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• Data predating DAMIR from recognized databases previously keystroked from 
authoritative paper SARs. 
• Rule-based, objective, calculated data 
The database is a union of authoritative DAMIR data and, for historical completeness, 
select non-DAMIR data. It is relational in order to support the analyses across multiple fields in 
the database and it generates flat file outputs/reports to automate the SAR analysis process for 
cost community users.  The CADE SAR database does not replace Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) for current SAR reporting.  DAMIR will continue 
to be the authoritative source of SAR data.   
Converting TOA (Budget) to Annual Expenditures (Base Year) 
RDT&E (appropriation 3600) is a unique appropriation in that funds are available for two 
fiscal years as long they are approved for the second fiscal year by the acquisition program’s 
Chief Financial Officer. The OSD-Comptroller outlay rate must therefore be apply to 
approximate multi-year spending. The example we use to illustrate this, as well illustrate the 
other methods in this chapter, is a shorter program, EELV, in Table 5. Previous related research 
have had to use an outlay rate to approximate multi-year spending. However, looking at our 
numbers and talking with experts who have done this research we decided to not take that into 
effect and just allocate RDT&E as a one-year appropriation.  
After collecting the then year expenditures from DAMIR, LCMC reports, and the CADE 
SAR beta site, we converted them to base year values due to the effects of inflation using the 
OSD Weighted Index 3600 inflation table. Appendix A shows the weighted index inflation 
values which, when the then year values are divided by them, are used to obtain the 2018 base 
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year dollars. Now, to compare each program standardized, we must place each program into a 
percent schedule by using the Millstone B and IOC dates.  
Converting Annual Expenditures to Percent Schedule by Percent Expenditures 
As stated previously, the two dates, Milestone B and IOC were selected because both 
were consistently published for all of our chosen programs. So the first estimates are from the 
closest SAR to MS B and the actuals are from the SAR directly after IOC. IOC was chosen as 
the end date because the IOC is a primary driver in determining the program’s development and 
production schedules…the program’s time phased estimate therefore must be consistent with the 
schedule…so that its budgetary inputs can support the achievement of the IOC. (AFCAH, 2007) 
Each program is truncated from MS B to the actual IOC date. In the EELV example 
shown in Table 6, Fiscal Year 1999 is truncated from 16 October 98, the actual MS B. So then 
the 1999 $417.28M estimate and the $419.21M actual budgets are now $399.89M and 
$401.74M, respectively. The same was done for 2002. The $355.11M estimate and $477.14M 
actual budgets are now $295.93M and $397.62M to account for only 10 months in Fiscal Year 
2002. Then the difference between those two budgets for each fiscal year was taken and added 
up to acquire the cumulative budget difference from MS B to IOC. In the far right of Table 7, the 
percent schedule and percent budget change were then determined by taken the change from 
each year and divided by the total schedule (1382 days) and cumulative budget change (45.53%).  
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Table 6: EELV RDT&E BY 18 Calculations without IOC Change 
 A B C D E F 
1 SAR Date: Dec-97 Dec-02    
2 1999 $417.28 $419.21  MS B - act 10/16/1998 
3 2000 $507.88 $503.19  IOC - pln 12/1/2001 
4 2001 $467.02 $573.49  IOC - act 8/1/2002 
5 2002 $355.11 $477.14    
       
7 SAR: Dec-97 Dec-02 Annual Diff Annual % Cum % Diff 
8 1999 $399.89 $401.74 $1.85 0.46% 0.4610% 
9 2000 $507.88 $503.19 -$4.69 -0.93% -0.31% 
10 2001 $467.02 $573.49 $106.47 18.56% 7.01% 
11 2002 $295.93 $397.62 $101.69 25.57% 10.94% 
       
13 Total $1,670.72 $1,876.04 $205.32  10.94% 
 
 
A. Analysis of Program Budget Change Using Percent Schedule 
Once the data was normalized and bracketed, we fit both an exponential and linear curve 
to each program’s graph. To do this, we first create a table as seen in the example of Table 7. 
Then, we graph the data, cumulative % schedule vs. cumulative % budget change, to see if the 
change can be explained better linearly or exponentially, meaning is the change consistent 
between MS B and IOC or does the amount of change increase as we move toward IOC? In this 
analysis, the schedule does not change, meaning we assumed we already knew when IOC was 
going to occur. The schedule, in Column F of Table 7, is the cumulative of the number of days of 
each fiscal year divided by the total number of days between MS B and IOC (Cell C8 of Table 
7). For the budget change, Column H, the cumulative of Column G, which was calculated by 
dividing the Annual Difference (Column D of Table 6) by the Total Difference (Cell D13 of 
Table 6). For some programs, Column I in Table 7 (Cum% Change Above Curve) had to be used 
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instead of Column H since an exponential curve will not fit a curve with negative values. So in 
this case, a small number, specifically .02, was added to each value to move the curve above the 
y-intercept value of zero. 
We analyzed the R2 of the exponential and linear functions of each program. R2 is a 
statistical measure of explained variance for two variables, usually one dependent and one 
independent variable. In our case, the R2 measures the variation in the budget change, the 
dependent variable, through the change in schedule, the independent variable. These results are 
further explained in Chapter 4. 
Table 7: EELV RDT&E BY 18 Calculations without IOC Change 
 A B C D F G H I 
1 start date end date days % Sched Cum % Sched % Change Cum % Change Cum % Change Above Curve 
2 10/16/1998 9/30/1999 349 25.25% 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.03 
3 10/1/1999 9/30/2000 365 26.41% 0.52 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
4 10/1/2000 9/30/2001 364 26.34% 0.78 0.52 0.50 0.52 
5 10/1/2001 8/1/2002 304 22.00% 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.02 
         
7  Total Days: 1382      
 
B. Analysis of Continuous RDT&E Budget Changes 
Once we calculated these differences, and if there was a curve fit to the growth, we were 
determined to see if there were any trends on when exactly the budget changes occurred. Part A 
of the methodology showed the overall difference from the estimate at Milestone B and the 
actual at IOC for specific fiscal years, but cannot tell us when, between those two dates, the 
changes occurred. To do this, we first looked at the RDT&E budget changes from SAR to SAR. 
Again, we analyzed 11 programs.  
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After looking at the overall budget change, we investigated the difference between each 
estimate from one SAR to the next SAR via three different ways: Annual % Budget Difference 
(Column D of Table 6), Cumulative % Budget Difference (Column E of Table 6), and 
Cumulative % Budget Change (Column I of Table 7). To standardize these between all of the 
programs, the data was linearly interpolated at 10% increments. 10% was chosen as the 
increment amount since Christensen (1994) identified overruns in costs around 10% program 
completion and Kozlak (2016) discovered that, even though it was for aircraft, that the cost 
growth factor of as program at IOC to be very close to the cost growth factor at program 
completion. After the difference between each increment was calculated, we conducted further 
research of any change of overall budget between increments that was above 10%.   
Table 8: Variables Analyzed between SARs 
Day Change in IOC Estimate 
Cum Schedule Change 
Total Days between MS B & IOC 
% Change Days btwn MS B & IOC 
Cum % Schedule Change 
$$ Change in Budget Estimate 
Cum Budget Change 
Total RDT&E Budget 
% Change in Budget Estimate 
Cum % Change 
 
The variables listed in Table 8 were placed into a correlation matrix to see if there was 
any correlation between the schedule variables and the budget variables. If there were any large 
correlations and they made sense, after we removed all of the data points when there was 0% 
schedule change, we researched those variables further to see if any specific data points stood out 
from the rest.  
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C. 60/45 Risk Adjusted Beta Curve Analysis 
As stated in Chapter 2, SMC utilizes a 60/45 Beta Curve to help time-phase their top 
level estimate. This assumes that 60% expenditures occur by the 45% schedule mark. In our 
case, the expenditures only include the RDT&E budgets of the fiscal years between MS B and 
IOC. That time period between those two dates is also our 100% schedule. We decided to 
quickly investigate how these programs’ RDT&E budget hold up to that rule. To get to the 
budget at the 45% schedule mark, we again used linear interpolation from fiscal year to fiscal 
year for each program.  
D. Inferential Analysis of Deviation from Actual Budget a Certain Number of Years Prior 
The last analysis performed was, as we got closer to each fiscal year’s actual budget, to 
determine how far away yearly estimates were to the associated actuals. To accomplish this, we 
aligned each fiscal year with the December SAR that occurred for that year, starting with the FY 
that IOC occurred and worked backwards. As an example, you can look at Table 9 and Figure 5 
for multiple fiscal years from AEHF.  
Table 9: AEHF Fiscal Year Changes Prior to Actual Budget 
Years Prior 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Five Years Prior $305.97 $371.71 $205.25 $247.43 $71.14 $29.28 $0.00 $51.40 $0.00 $39.52 
Four Years Prior $521.99 $402.53 $491.15 $240.31 $127.03 $28.83 $192.16 $51.40 $67.84 $39.83 
Three Years Prior $570.16 $759.76 $490.31 $424.36 $125.19 $405.18 $192.16 $171.29 $67.84 $162.77 
Two Years Prior $863.31 $761.37 $724.04 $452.84 $532.78 $391.60 $303.95 $187.64 $214.26 $221.06 
One Years Prior $851.14 $758.40 $719.49 $450.97 $529.45 $391.60 $300.91 $208.48 $213.95 $264.02 
Final RDT&E Amount $829.87 $741.57 $734.93 $515.16 $523.49 $421.43 $300.91 $163.71 $225.75 $255.57 
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Figure 5: Graphed AEHF Fiscal Year Changes Prior to Actual Budget 
 
 
From just a simple eye test from this program, one can tell there is a significant trend for 
all of the fiscal years that RDT&E does not change very much from the estimate from the SAR 
two years prior to the actual budget. Therefore, we collected data from 5 years all the way up to 
1 year prior to the actual RDT&E budget. Table 10 displays the sample sizes available for all 
prior year analyses. The Fiscal Years 2000 and 2008 for many of the programs were unusable 
since there was acquisition reform during those two timeframes and SARs we not required, 
therefore no actual data for those fiscal years was available. 
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Table 10: FY Sample Sizes 
Years Prior FY Amount 
5 Years 23 
4 Years 109 
3 Years 124 
2 Years 139 
1 year 143 
The tables in Appendix B display how the SAR RDT&E data for AEHF was initially 
adjusted to line up each SAR at the end of that FY. The results from this analysis, which includes 
all of the programs’ fiscal years, are explained further in Chapter 4. 
Summary 
This chapter explains our proposed steps to analyze the deviation between RDT&E 
budget estimates and actuals. We begin by collecting our data from DAMIR, CADE, and LCMC. 
After normalizing the data, it was placed into a percent schedule. Next, we fit a curve to the 
deviation between estimated budgets at Milestone B and the actual budgets for at IOC. Next, we 
analyze the large changes from FY to FY was to determine when the largest deviations occurred 
and if there is any correlation between schedule variables and budget variables. We also see if 
these budget amounts fit the 60/45 linearly interpolated. Lastly, estimates from specific years 
prior from each actual amount are examined to see how different those estimates were from said 
actuals. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results from the methodology and data introduced in Chapter 3, 
starting with the exponential and linear fits we identified using scatter plots. From our database, 
we determined which type of curve fit the programs delta between the RDT&E estimated and 
actual budgets. Second, each program’s specific fiscal year (FY) was looked at to determine 
when the largest changes occurred. Also, using this data, we determined how much the estimate 
changed each year within 5 years of said FY. 
A. Analysis of Program Budget Change Using Percent Schedule 
Each program was graphed separately to illustrate if we could apply different fit lines. 
This then allowed us to further investigate any significant reason why the change in RDT&E 
budget was so large. Figures 6 through 17 display the graph and Table 10 displays the R2’s for 
each program.  
 
Figure 6: AEHF Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
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Figure 7: DSCS III Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: DSP Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
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Figure 9: EELV Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: EPS Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
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Figure 11: GPS III Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: GPS IIR Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
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Figure 13: MUOS Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: SBIRS HI Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
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Figure 15: Space Fence Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: WGS Overlay Plot w/o IOC Change 
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Table 11: Program R2’s 
Program Exponential R2 Linear R2 
AEHF 0.9776749 0.8880131 
DSCS III 0.9935748 0.8258368 
DSP 0.5552271 0.3289354 
EELV 0.9584397 0.8558863 
EPS 0.21337 0.2411105 
GPS III 0.8785845 0.8167186 
GPS IIR 0.9751514 0.3700347 
MUOS 0.883401 0.4224695 
SBIRS HI 0.9102613 0.5539839 
Space Fence 0.9047185 0.7785527 
WGS 0.8533301 0.7973553 
Mean 0.830186273 0.625398791 
Median 0.9102613 0.7785527 
 
As mentioned earlier, the delta each fiscal year of each program was graphed using its 
estimate at Milestone B and its actual at IOC. Through graphing these using a percent schedule 
graph, we discovered that only 1 R2 from the exponential function was less than .85, which was 
EPS at .21. 10 out of 11 programs’ exponential R2s were larger than the linear R2 for the same 
program and the mean and median were larger for exponential as well.  
B. Analysis of Continuous RDT&E Budget Changes 
Since most of the deviations fit an exponential curve better than a linear curve, this means 
that budget growth does not occur at a constant rate. We were determined to see when the largest 
budget changes occurred. Therefore, we analyzed the Annual % Budget Difference (Column D 
of Table 5), Cumulative % Budget Change (Column I of Table 6), and the Cumulative % Budget 
Difference (Column E of Table 5). 
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Table 12: Annual % Budget Difference 
Sched Interval 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
AEHF -0.09 0.18 0.17 0.69 0.68 0.74 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.94 
DSCS 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.32 0.55 0.82 0.97 
DSP 0.24 -0.27 -0.61 0.06 0.18 0.27 1.19 1.20 1.23 0.79 
EELV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.22 0.26 
EPS -0.07 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 0.07 0.24 
GPS III -0.22 -0.21 0.02 0.54 0.71 0.14 1.06 3.26 6.67 7.38 
GPS IIR -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.23 -0.16 -0.18 0.08 0.50 
MUOS -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.36 0.66 0.93 
SBIRS HI 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.15 -0.43 0.05 0.35 0.55 0.77 0.86 
Space Fence -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.15 -0.19 -0.17 -0.09 -0.08 -0.18 -0.29 
WGS -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.28 0.81 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Mean -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.09 0.12 0.20 0.42 0.70 1.11 1.23 
Median -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.14 0.32 0.55 0.77 0.86 
 
Table 12 highlights all intervals for each program that had a negative budget growth in 
green. Many programs, including major programs that eventually had substantial budget growth 
later in their RDT&E budgets, even had negative budget growth early on between MS B and 
IOC. The larger growth toward the end of the schedule shows that programs may be being 
delayed for certain reasons and budgets are increasing and being pushed farther into the 
program’s life. Tables 13 through 16 display cumulative budget difference, in cumulative % 
budget change and cumulative % budget difference.  
The highlighted cells in Table 14 show the largest % budget change for each program. 
Cumulative % budget change can be misleading, especially when a program has negative budget 
changes or overall negative budget changes, which happened with two programs, EPS and Space 
Fence. Table 11 shows EPS having above a 100% cumulative budget change from the 60% to 
90% intervals while its overall budget change is negative. Also, Space Fence has an overall 
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negative budget change but one could not tell by looking at Tables 13 and 14 because all of the 
percentages are positive. 
Table 13: Cumulative % Budget Change 
Sched Interval 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.00 
AEHF -2.69% 2.07% 7.13% 26.64% 44.66% 58.75% 74.57% 86.10% 91.91% 100.00% 
DSCS 0.00% 2.78% 6.75% 10.90% 15.13% 20.11% 25.17% 42.25% 62.33% 100.00% 
DSP 3.76% -33.70% -102.92% -89.83% -84.69% -69.87% -20.08% 19.69% 60.50% 100.00% 
EELV 0.36% 0.72% 0.48% -0.37% -1.21% 14.57% 34.52% 54.97% 77.49% 100.00% 
EPS 52.06% 78.57% 79.53% 80.48% 94.15% 126.91% 159.66% 171.82% 135.91% 100.00% 
GPS III -20.88% -42.90% -43.46% -13.02% 16.86% 19.61% 39.45% 67.86% 86.36% 100.00% 
GPS IIR -0.54% -0.55% -0.64% -1.15% 2.26% 11.79% 4.89% 2.02% 18.23% 100.00% 
MUOS -1.94% -4.34% -7.53% -12.68% -18.03% -20.07% -16.79% 4.22% 37.56% 100.00% 
SBIRS HI 0.22% 0.24% -1.30% -6.12% -18.06% -11.40% 2.02% 26.91% 65.51% 100.00% 
Space Fence 6.53% 15.50% 24.46% 46.95% 70.93% 82.27% 85.17% 88.87% 94.43% 100.00% 
WGS -3.97% -4.91% -5.85% -6.79% -1.26% 17.62% 69.24% 82.50% 91.50% 100.00% 
Mean 2.99% 1.23% -3.94% 3.18% 10.98% 22.75% 41.62% 58.84% 74.70% 100.00% 
Median 0.00% 0.24% -0.64% -1.15% 2.26% 17.62% 34.52% 54.97% 77.49% 100.00% 
 
Table 14: Cumulative % Budget Change Year to Year 
Sched Interval 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.00 
AEHF -2.69% 4.77% 5.06% 19.51% 18.02% 14.09% 15.82% 11.54% 5.81% 8.09% 
DSCS 0.00% 2.78% 3.97% 4.15% 4.23% 4.98% 5.06% 17.07% 20.08% 37.67% 
DSP 3.76% -37.46% -69.23% 13.10% 5.14% 14.82% 49.79% 39.78% 40.80% 39.50% 
EELV 0.36% 0.36% -0.24% -0.85% -0.85% 15.79% 19.94% 20.46% 22.51% 22.51% 
EPS 52.06% 26.51% 0.96% 0.96% 13.67% 32.75% 32.75% 12.15% -35.91% -35.91% 
GPS III -20.88% -22.02% -0.56% 30.45% 29.88% 2.75% 19.84% 28.40% 18.51% 13.64% 
GPS IIR -0.54% -0.01% -0.09% -0.51% 3.40% 9.53% -6.90% -2.87% 16.21% 81.77% 
MUOS -1.94% -2.39% -3.19% -5.16% -5.34% -2.04% 3.28% 21.01% 33.33% 62.44% 
SBIRS HI 0.22% 0.02% -1.54% -4.82% -11.93% 6.66% 13.42% 24.89% 38.60% 34.49% 
Space Fence 6.53% 8.96% 8.96% 22.48% 23.99% 11.33% 2.90% 3.70% 5.57% 5.57% 
WGS -3.97% -0.94% -0.94% -0.94% 5.53% 18.88% 51.62% 13.26% 9.00% 8.50% 
Mean 2.99% -1.77% -5.17% 7.12% 7.80% 11.78% 18.87% 17.22% 15.86% 25.30% 
Median 0.00% 0.02% -0.24% 0.96% 5.14% 11.33% 15.82% 17.07% 18.51% 22.51% 
 
35 
 
To help with this we also investigated the Cumulative % Budget Difference. This 
difference again illustrates the % difference from year to year but is not distorted when negative 
values are present. The highlighted cells in Table 16 show the top 10% of the budget differences. 
Table 15: Cumulative % Budget Difference 
Sched Interval 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.00 
AEHF -9.28% 2.15% 6.55% 19.60% 27.82% 32.62% 37.97% 41.33% 42.79% 44.76% 
DSCS 0.00% 2.23% 5.40% 7.36% 8.79% 10.61% 12.53% 18.42% 25.29% 35.28% 
DSP 29.25% -13.50% -38.11% -28.48% -22.70% -16.68% -4.07% 2.99% 8.67% 13.35% 
EELV 0.18% 0.37% 0.32% 0.03% -0.26% 1.94% 4.76% 7.37% 9.16% 10.94% 
EPS -7.47% -10.14% -8.01% -5.88% -4.99% -5.95% -6.92% -7.08% -5.36% -3.64% 
GPS III -25.15% -29.20% -19.25% -4.78% 4.09% 4.18% 7.80% 12.52% 15.34% 17.29% 
GPS IIR -0.78% -0.60% -0.52% -0.69% 0.79% 4.92% 1.97% 0.71% 3.75% 19.53% 
MUOS -2.19% -3.38% -3.94% -4.67% -5.15% -4.88% -3.59% 0.68% 6.38% 15.71% 
SBIRS HI 1.47% 0.99% -1.35% -6.13% -15.12% -7.95% 0.45% 10.57% 23.14% 31.09% 
Space Fence -5.58% -7.51% -9.45% -12.54% -15.76% -16.29% -15.02% -14.31% -14.87% -15.44% 
WGS -7.06% -6.84% -6.62% -6.41% -1.65% 11.07% 34.15% 38.73% 41.25% 43.54% 
Mean -2.42% -5.95% -6.82% -3.87% -2.19% 1.23% 6.36% 10.17% 14.14% 19.31% 
Median -2.19% -3.38% -3.94% -4.78% -1.65% 1.94% 1.97% 7.37% 9.16% 17.29% 
 
Table 16: Cumulative % Budget Difference Year to Year 
Sched Interval 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.00 
AEHF -9.28% 11.43% 4.40% 13.05% 8.22% 4.79% 5.35% 3.36% 1.46% 1.97% 
DSCS 0.00% 2.23% 3.18% 1.96% 1.43% 1.82% 1.92% 5.88% 6.88% 9.98% 
DSP 29.25% -42.75% -24.61% 9.64% 5.77% 6.02% 12.61% 7.05% 5.68% 4.68% 
EELV 0.18% 0.18% -0.05% -0.29% -0.29% 2.20% 2.82% 2.61% 1.79% 1.79% 
EPS -7.47% -2.67% 2.13% 2.13% 0.89% -0.97% -0.97% -0.16% 1.72% 1.72% 
GPS III -25.15% -4.05% 9.95% 14.47% 8.87% 0.09% 3.62% 4.72% 2.83% 1.95% 
GPS IIR -0.78% 0.19% 0.08% -0.17% 1.48% 4.13% -2.95% -1.26% 3.05% 15.78% 
MUOS -2.19% -1.19% -0.56% -0.73% -0.48% 0.27% 1.29% 4.28% 5.70% 9.33% 
SBIRS HI 1.47% -0.48% -2.34% -4.78% -8.99% 7.16% 8.40% 10.13% 12.57% 7.95% 
Space Fence -5.58% -1.93% -1.93% -3.09% -3.22% -0.53% 1.27% 0.72% -0.56% -0.56% 
WGS -7.06% 0.22% 0.22% 0.22% 4.76% 12.72% 23.08% 4.58% 2.52% 2.29% 
Mean -2.42% -3.53% -0.87% 2.94% 1.68% 3.43% 5.13% 3.81% 3.97% 5.17% 
Median -2.19% -0.48% 0.08% 0.22% 1.43% 2.20% 2.82% 4.28% 2.83% 2.29% 
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With such a small sample size of space programs, we were able to investigate to 
determine if any similar causes emerged that created these very large budget increases in Tables 
14 and 16. The next sections includes details about some of the major causes in this budget 
growth.  
AEHF 
The September 2008 SAR was an exception as it was submitted for a Nunn-McCurdy 
unit cost breach. The breach was mainly due to an addition of a 4TH Space Vehicle (SV-4) after a 
production break of four years. Part of the recertification process was that the Air Force worked 
on an Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) to address an FY09 RDT&E shortfall. In this 
SAR, the total amount for FY10 and FY11 increased from $154.02M to $947.15M with the 
addition of $192.16M for FY12. In the December 2010 SAR, FY12 and FY13 RDT&E funding 
increased from $243.56M to $475.25M. In the December 2012 SAR, FY14 and FY15 RDT&E 
funding increased from $107.67M to $377.03M. 
DSCS III 
 Throughout the three SARs, FY82 RDT&E costs increased from $22.01M to $268.75M 
in those 4 years. Since this was before SARs were uploaded into DAMIR, we do not have 
specific reasoning for why these fiscal years increased by this much. 
GPS III 
The increase for FY16 can be contributed to delays and cost overruns, mainly from 
Navigation Payload design issues, which caused a breach in the APB schedule and led to an 
Over Target Baseline (OTB) for a new cost and schedule baseline. The OTB started in July 2014 
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and was completed in March 2015. The technical issues in the Navigational Payload had been 
resolved in that timeframe and the parts were delivered in March 2015 as well. 
MUOS 
The total 2012 RDT&E budget increased from $116.25M to $267.09M in the December 
2009 SAR. The production schedule had technical issues that created delays. Based on findings, 
the program was then restructured to support a Dec 2011 On-Orbit Capability, a delay of 21 
months from the original.  
SBIRS HI 
SBIRS-HI experienced a Nunn-McCurdy breach and an Acquisition Program Breach 
(APB) in December 2001. This was from significant cost and schedule delays and an inability to 
meet the original IOC schedule. At the end of 2001, there was a Program Acquisition Unit Cost 
(PAUC) increase of 70%. To support future funding requirements, the defense appropriations bill 
provided an additional $40M in RDT&E funding. However, it was denied additional 
procurement funding which caused a need to requalify radiation-hardened parts due to industry 
obsolescence issues.  
Another SBIRS-HI issue found by Porter (2009) were with the specific format of 
contractor reports. They used their own format to report cost and schedule. He also mentioned 
that SBIRS-HI did not have a Milestone A review, which could have identified some of the very 
costly system engineering problems in the early stages and could have mitigated some of the 
program’s issues, the same issues that prior, analogous programs had encountered and SBIRS-HI 
suffered from weak oversight on the contractor, who was “inadequately-qualified”. 
 
38 
 
WGS 
Fiscal Years’ 2004 and 2005 RDT&E budgets were affected by WGS’ Space Vehicle 3. 
SV-3 actually started as SV-1 but additional time was needed replace and inspect the fasteners 
that were installed incorrectly. The original launched was pushed back by 15 months, resulting in 
an IOC threshold delay of 12 months, and SV-2 became SV-1 and SV-1 became SV-3. All of the 
RDT&E for WGS went towards the Ground and Block II development. So the delay pushed out 
all extraneous WGS activities, therefore pushing out all RDT&E funding by a year. 
As stated in Chapter 3, we also looked at each program’s overall budget change from 
SAR to SAR. Table 17 shows our entire correlation matrix for all of our schedule variables vs. 
all of our budget variable. From this, we analyzed the three largest correlations illustrated in 
Figures 17 to 19. The relationships between the two variables in Figures 17, 18, and 19 had an R2 
of .825, .876, and .837, respectively. With these high R2’s, a program office can potentially 
predict how much of a budget increase, or decrease, it can expect, if there is a schedule increase 
or decrease, or vis-a-versa.  
 
Table 17:  
  
$$ Change in 
Budget Estimate 
Cum Budget 
Change 
Total RDT&E 
Budget 
% Change in 
Budget Estimate 
Cum % Budget 
Change 
Day Change in IOD Estimate 0.307199112 0.359482248 0.315322515 0.071343334 0.271615415 
Cum Schedule Change 0.001408175 0.668447701 0.406905536 -0.184143515 0.837436105 
Total Days between MS B & IOD 0.14389639 0.825105965 0.665485202 -0.17185459 0.669635447 
% Change Days btwn MS B & IOD 0.335594135 0.147217136 0.123067797 0.167996033 0.153108409 
Cum % Schedule Change -0.01679616 0.418146798 0.160363442 -0.09346429 0.875691691 
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Figure 17: Bivariate Fit of Cum Budget Change By Total Days btwn MS B & IOC 
 
 
Figure 18: Bivariate Fit of Cum % Budget Change By Cum % Schedule Change 
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Figure 19: Bivariate Fit of Cum % Budget Change By Cum Schedule Change 
 
C. 60/45 Risk Adjusted Beta Curve Analysis 
 
 
Figure 20: Program Budget % at 45% Complete Overlay Plot 
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Table 18: Program Budget % at 45% Complete Overlay Plot 
Schedule 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
AEHF 0.00 0.14 0.34 0.47 0.60 0.65 0.72 0.80 0.88 0.93 0.96 1.00 
DSCS III 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.39 0.50 0.54 0.59 0.65 0.70 0.78 0.86 1.00 
DSP 0.00 0.18 0.30 0.36 0.43 0.46 0.50 0.59 0.71 0.81 0.90 1.00 
EELV 0.00 0.09 0.17 0.26 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.58 0.69 0.81 0.90 1.00 
EPS 0.00 0.17 0.32 0.44 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.75 0.82 0.89 0.95 1.00 
GPS III 0.00 0.12 0.26 0.42 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.80 0.87 0.94 0.97 1.00 
GPS IIR 0.00 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.34 0.39 0.47 0.51 0.57 0.68 1.00 
MUOS 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.29 0.43 0.49 0.56 0.68 0.77 0.85 0.93 1.00 
SBIRS HI 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.19 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.48 0.59 0.72 0.88 1.00 
Space Fence 0.00 0.16 0.28 0.39 0.53 0.60 0.67 0.79 0.88 0.96 0.98 1.00 
WGS 0.00 0.25 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.64 0.87 0.92 0.96 1.00 
Mean 0.00 0.13 0.24 0.35 0.46 0.51 0.56 0.66 0.76 0.83 0.91 1.00 
Median 0.00 0.14 0.26 0.39 0.47 0.50 0.56 0.65 0.77 0.85 0.93 1.00 
  
Figure 20 and Table 18 illustrate the results from the linear interpolation of budget 
expenditures at 45% schedule between MS B and IOC. The mean is 51% and median is 50%, 
both short of the 60% goal. 4 of our programs were at or above the 60% mark while the other 7 
are below that same mark. 
D. Inferential Analysis of Deviation from Actual Budget a Certain Number of Years Prior 
Lastly, for our inferential analysis. In addition to looking at the trend of the delta of each 
fiscal year, the percentage change in the years leading up to the actual RDT&E budget was 
examined here as well. After during a test trial using fiscal years we had estimates for at least 5 
years prior, we did a larger test with all programs with all of the data available. Table 19 shows 
the descriptive statistics of the years’ prior tests including all fiscal years, including the 
associated confidence intervals. Therefore, we are 95% confident that the true difference 
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between the true budget and the estimate of that budget, two years out, is between 13.8% and 
26.8%. 
Table 19: Years Prior Descriptive Statistics 
 Years Prior Sample Size Mean Std Dev Upper 95% Mean Lower 95% Mean 
 5 Years  23 .593 .304 .724 .461 
 4 Years  110 .448 .346 .513 .382 
 3 Years  124 .338 .453 .419 .258 
 2 Years  139 .203 .387 .268 .138 
 1 year  143 .148 .412 .216 .080 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Program Fiscal Year 5 Years Prior 
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Figure 22: Program Fiscal Year 4 Years Prior 
 
 
 
  
Figure 23: Program Fiscal Year 3 Years Prior 
 
-50.0%
0.0%
50.0%
100.0%
150.0%
200.0%
250.0%
300.0%
350.0%
400.0%
44 
 
  
Figure 24: Program Fiscal Year 2 Years Prior 
 
 
 
  
Figure 25: Program Fiscal Year 1 Year Prior 
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Table 20: Years Prior Descriptive Statistics After 2002 
 Years Prior Sample Size Mean Std Dev Upper 95% Mean Lower 95% Mean 
 4 Years 57 .423 .296 .502 .345 
 3 Years 66 .267 .245 .328 .207 
 2 Years 76 .131 .200 .176 .085 
 1 year 82 .159 .495 .267 .0498 
 
In Figure 24, there were 6 outliers outside 2 standard deviations. Of those 6, 5 of those 
years are Fiscal Year 2001 or earlier. Since this was the first test we ran, we limited all our 
second histograms for 4 to 1 year prior to data points 2002 and later. So the first histogram in 
each of the last 5 figures includes all available data points while the second in each was limited 
to only all data points 2002 and later. The last outlier from 2 years prior was 2016 AEHF 
(119.49%) and the one extreme outlier from 1 year prior is EELV 2008 (418.75%). However, 
both of these actual budget values are less than the estimated budgets 2 and 1 year prior. 
Summary 
 Many of the findings from both the statistical and inferential analysis indicate that many 
of the programs are underspending at the beginning of the programs, after MS B, and almost all 
are overspending toward the end at IOC. This is compared to what is time-phased for, i.e. 60% 
spent by 45% schedule. This could potentially indicate that a new phasing method may need to 
be utilized for new space programs. The next chapter goes more into these results with their 
respective research question as well as talks about some limitations as well as potential future 
research. 
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Chapter V: Conclusions & Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
 In this chapter, we restate and address our research questions to ensure we 
accomplished our intended goal. We also state the limitations of our research, make 
recommendations for future research, and summarize the overall significance of this research. 
Research Questions Answered 
1. Does a linear or exponential function best reflect how RDT&E budget changes as a space 
program progresses through its schedule? 
From the 11 programs analyzed, 10 of the R2’s from an exponential function were 
larger than the R2 from the linear function. The exponential curve can better fit the deviation of 
each fiscal year’s RDT&E budget between a program’s MS B and IOC. That deviation is 
therefore not constant and more of the estimate changes occur later, rather than earlier or at the 
same rate, between those two dates. This could potentially infer that many programs, especially 
longer ones, need more time to mature and develop or this trend of exponential growth will 
continue.  
2. When do those budget estimates actually change and what are associated with those 
changes? 
 Since the exponential line fit better than the linear line, deviations in budget to not occur 
at a constant rate. With the deeper dive into when the largest deviations occurred, there was no 
huge commonality on when these largest deviations occurred and what caused them. Many of the 
large deviations occurred toward the end of the schedule so again displaying the same evidence 
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as in the first part of our analysis that change is not constant and much of the change occurs in 
the later part of the schedule.  
3. Do actual RDT&E budgets following the 60/45 rule when looking at the time between MS B 
and IOC? 
The mean and median, 51% and 50% respectively, at 45% schedule are a decent amount 
off from the 60% SMC uses. This is again using the MSB to IOC as the schedule and only 
looking at RDT&E. Even though the programs’ RDT&E budgets are being spent at about the 
predicted rate, this test does not take cost growth for each year into effect. This 56% compares to 
Burgess’ 65% at 50% schedule for space programs, but he used “launch date” as the end point 
instead of IOC and also used a Beta curve instead of linear interpolation. 
4. As RDT&E estimates get closer to actual budgets, how much are they off the actual budget? 
 As a program nears a specific fiscal year, the chance that it will be closer to the actual 
budget increases, as seen in Chapter 4. Budgets for programs are updated every year, if not more. 
It is very hard for a Program Manager to give a specific point estimate. With this research, he or 
she can now continually decrease the range of the confidence interval each year. Once an 
RDT&E budget is two years out, there is a 95% chance that that fiscal year’s budget is at most 
26.8% from what the actual budget will be. The most important product to come out of this 
inferential analysis is that the sooner a program office can recognize that a change will occur, 
whatever the cause was, the better off the both the schedule and budget estimates will be. 
Limitations 
We recognized that there were few limitations during our research. First, we were unable 
to receive actual contract information so we had to use SAR budget RDT&E costs instead. 
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Therefore, we did not account RDT&E costs as 2-year appropriations. With the small amount of 
programs with the requisite data available, we could not compare if there were any statistical 
differences between different types of programs. Also, we did not normalize for quantity amount 
or quantity changes within the programs. 
SARs also have some limitations within themselves with respect to measuring budget 
growth discussed by Hough (1992): 
• Some programs do not use a consistent baseline cost estimate 
• Some programs exclude significant cost elements 
• Some classes of programs, such as special action programs, are excluded 
• Preparation guidelines constantly change and are inconsistently interpreted 
• Some programs share cost 
• Some programs report the effect of cost changes instead of the root causes 
• Some programs have unknown and varying funding levels 
The term IOC, was not consistently used for all programs to describe that Milestone. To 
the best of our knowledge, researching and cross checking all of our sources, i.e. DAMIR, 
CADE, and LCMC reports, the dates presented in the study consistently represent the definition 
of the Milestone which was explained in Chapter 3. Table 21 shows the definition from an 
LCMC report. This term was then confirmed on DAMIR. Also, reporting requirements have 
changed throughout the years and may differ between in the older and newer programs. An 
example of this would be DSCS IOC planned and actual dates being the same as this is most 
likely not accurate but it was not required to record such information 36 years ago. 
 
49 
 
Table 21: IOC LCMC Definitions 
Program IOC Definition from LCMC Report 
AEHF Initial Operational Capability 
DSCS III Initial Operational Deployment 
DSP Satellite 14 Delivery 
EELV MLV First Operational Flight - HLV First 
Operational Flight planned for Nov-07 
EPS Required Assets Available (RAA) 
GPS-III GPS IIIA SV-1 available for launch 
GPS Sat Blk IIR/R(M)/F Availability of first Blk IIR for launch 
GPS UE Initial Production Deliveries 
MUOS On Orbit Capability 
SBIRS HI Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) Sensor Delivery. First 
satellite (GEO 1) delivery/launch planned for June 
2002 
Space Fence Required Assets Available (RAA) 
WGS Initial Operational Capability 
 
Another limitation we dealt with is that there were some inconsistencies in the reasoning 
on why specific FY funding changed after that FY ended. A couple of the reasons that programs 
offices provided were small accounting errors as well as program RDT&E budgets being 
separated into subprograms. For example, the AEHF subprogram for SVs 1-4 reached 90% in 
FY17. Therefore on the December 2017 SAR, on RDT&E used for SV 5-6 was included, which 
decreased previous year budgets substantially. Since there was no consistency as well as too 
many budgets changing retrospectively, we used the amount in the SAR following the end of the 
fiscal year, such as the budget given for FY11 in the December 2011 SAR even if it changed in 
the December 2013 SAR, etc. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
One recommendation for future research is to apply this research to other program types 
as well as other types of money, such as aircraft and Procurement dollars, respectively. With a 
larger data set, one can determine if there are any statistical differences between different types 
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of weapon systems, older and newer programs, complete and continuing programs, etc. There are 
many studies that research the causes of cost growth but fall short in determining if there is any 
correlation of when these changes in budget occur in each of these programs. Future research can 
help develop better estimates and confidence intervals as program offices continue to move 
through the different life cycle stages of programs. Also, after discovering that many programs 
underspend, a research project focusing on creating new phasing methods for space programs 
could also be significant. 
Summary 
Through this research, we showed that we can potentially narrow down when and why 
changes in RDT&E estimates occur for space programs. The closer a program gets to the actual 
budget, the smaller the difference is between the estimate and the actual budget. However, 
through this and further research, we can increase our confidence in the estimates we present and 
decrease cost and schedule variances in future programs. 
There will always be variables that cannot be controlled at the program level, such as the 
political and economic environment. Also, we may need to look at a higher level, to not just 
change the game play. Drezner (1993) said it well: 
“Nonetheless, rather than suggest that we have reached the limits of our estimating 
ability, the apparent consistency in cost growth could be explained in terms of incomplete or 
incorrect implementation of the various cost control and budgeting initiatives, due to strong 
institutional barriers. We have not yet fully examined an important set of potential explanatory 
variables – institutional and incentive factors – that may be fundamental drivers of cost growth.” 
 
Research, such as ours, can assist in identifying some cost growth factors but even with 
all of these studies and continuous reforms there has not been much improvement seen. If there 
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is to be significant change, there needs to be an overhaul of the rules of the game and the 
institution itself. 
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Appendix A: Raw Index 
Program Base Year: 2018 
1949 0.07232 1979 0.25089 2009 0.85682 2039 1.79591 
1950 0.07315 1980 0.28588 2010 0.87146 2040 1.84493 
1951 0.07693 1981 0.3295 2011 0.89836 2041 1.89529 
1952 0.07886 1982 0.35669 2012 0.91955 2042 1.94703 
1953 0.08008 1983 0.38697 2013 0.93581 2043 2.00017 
1954 0.08119 1984 0.41046 2014 0.9493 2044 2.05477 
1955 0.08279 1985 0.42877 2015 0.95903 2045 2.11086 
1956 0.08525 1986 0.43741 2016 0.97272 2046 2.16848 
1957 0.08798 1987 0.4483 2017 0.99293 2047 2.22767 
1958 0.08991 1988 0.46094 2018 1.02017 2048 2.28848 
1959 0.09158 1989 0.48977 2019 1.04802 2049 2.35094 
1960 0.09321 1990 0.50731 2020 1.07662 2050 2.41512 
1961 0.09442 1991 0.52852 2021 1.10601 2051 2.48104 
1962 0.09584 1992 0.54641 2022 1.1362 2052 2.54876 
1963 0.09743 1993 0.5617 2023 1.16722 2053 2.61834 
1964 0.09906 1994 0.57497 2024 1.19908 2054 2.68981 
1965 0.1012 1995 0.58862 2025 1.23181 2055 2.76323 
1966 0.10415 1996 0.59994 2026 1.26543 2056 2.83866 
1967 0.1077 1997 0.60715 2027 1.29997 2057 2.91614 
1968 0.11204 1998 0.61076 2028 1.33546 2058 2.99574 
1969 0.11758 1999 0.62093 2029 1.37191 2059 3.07752 
1970 0.12384 2000 0.63952 2030 1.40936 2060 3.16152 
1971 0.12986 2001 0.65843 2031 1.44783 2061 3.24782 
1972 0.13512 2002 0.67443 2032 1.48735 2062 3.33647 
1973 0.13926 2003 0.6939 2033 1.52795 2063 3.42755 
1974 0.14846 2004 0.7229 2034 1.56966 2064 3.52111 
1975 0.17055 2005 0.75127 2035 1.6125 2065 3.61722 
1976 0.19535 2006 0.78048 2036 1.65652 2066 3.71596 
1977 0.21059 2007 0.80815 2037 1.70174 2067 3.81739 
1978 0.23126 2008 0.83559 2038 1.74819 2068 3.92159 
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Appendix B: Analysis of Prior Year Differences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SAR: Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15
2006 305.97$     521.99$     570.16$     863.31$     851.14$    829.87$     829.87$     829.87$     829.87$     829.87$     829.87$     829.87$     829.87$     829.87$     829.87$     
2007 203.30$     371.71$     402.53$     759.76$     761.37$    758.40$     741.57$     741.57$     741.57$     741.57$     741.57$     741.57$     741.57$     741.57$     741.57$     
2008 253.47$     204.65$     205.25$     491.15$     490.31$    724.04$     719.49$     734.93$     788.79$     788.79$     788.79$     788.79$     788.79$     788.79$     788.79$     
2009 179.15$     127.33$     130.13$     247.43$     240.31$    424.36$     452.84$     450.97$     515.16$     514.35$     514.35$     514.35$     514.35$     514.35$     514.35$     
2010 18.02$       18.02$       18.02$       82.62$       71.14$       127.03$     125.19$     532.78$     529.45$     523.49$     523.49$     523.49$     523.49$     523.49$     523.49$     
2011 17.59$       17.59$       17.59$       67.23$       53.76$       29.28$       28.83$       405.18$     391.60$     391.60$     421.43$     421.43$     421.43$     421.43$     421.43$     
2012 17.51$       17.51$       17.51$       17.51$       -$           -$            -$            192.16$     192.16$     303.95$     300.91$     300.91$     308.30$     313.52$     313.52$     
2013 17.63$       17.63$       17.63$       17.63$       -$           -$            -$            51.40$       51.40$       171.29$     187.64$     208.48$     163.71$     162.43$     162.43$     
2014 16.75$       16.75$       16.75$       16.75$       -$           -$            -$            -$            -$            67.84$       67.84$       214.26$     213.95$     225.75$     231.54$     
2015 16.37$       16.37$       16.37$       16.37$       -$           -$            -$            -$            -$            39.52$       39.83$       162.77$     221.06$     264.02$     255.57$     
Years Prior: Five Years Prior Four Years Prior Three Years Prior Two Years Prior One Years Prior Final RDT&E Amount
2006 521.99$                          570.16$                           863.31$                               851.14$                          829.87$                          829.87$                                       
2007 402.53$                          759.76$                           761.37$                               758.40$                          741.57$                          741.57$                                       
2008 491.15$                          490.31$                           724.04$                               719.49$                          734.93$                          734.93$                                       
2009 240.31$                          424.36$                           452.84$                               571.19$                          450.97$                          515.16$                                       
2010 127.03$                          125.19$                           541.96$                               532.78$                          529.45$                          523.49$                                       
2011 28.83$                             405.18$                           405.18$                               391.60$                          391.60$                          421.43$                                       
2012 192.16$                          192.16$                           192.16$                               303.95$                          300.91$                          300.91$                                       
2013 51.40$                             51.40$                              171.29$                               187.64$                          208.48$                          163.71$                                       
2014 -$                                 67.84$                              67.84$                                 214.26$                          213.95$                          225.75$                                       
2015 39.52$                             39.83$                              162.77$                               221.06$                          264.02$                          255.57$                                       
Years Prior: 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Five Years Prior 305.97$     371.71$     205.25$     247.43$     71.14$       29.28$      0 51.40$       -$            39.52$       
Four Years Prior 521.99$     402.53$     491.15$     240.31$     127.03$     28.83$      192.16$     51.40$       67.84$       39.83$       
Three Years Prior 570.16$     759.76$     490.31$     424.36$     125.19$     405.18$    192.16$     171.29$     67.84$       162.77$     
Two Years Prior 863.31$     761.37$     724.04$     452.84$     532.78$     391.60$    303.95$     187.64$     214.26$     221.06$     
One Years Prior 851.14$     758.40$     719.49$     450.97$     529.45$     391.60$    300.91$     208.48$     213.95$     264.02$     
Final RDT&E Amount 829.87$     741.57$     $734.93 515.16$     523.49$     421.43$    300.91$     163.71$     225.75$     255.57$     
54 
 
Appendix C: Acronyms  
ACE-IT - Automated Cost Estimating 
Integrated Tools 
AEHF - Advanced Extremely High 
Frequency 
AFCAH - Air Force Cost Analysis 
Handbook 
BTR - Baseline Target Review 
BY – Base Year 
CADE - Cost Assessment Data Enterprise 
CEH - Cost Estimating Handbook 
CER - Cost Estimating Relationships 
COSYSMO - Constructive Systems 
Engineering Cost Model 
DAMIR - Defense Acquisition Management 
Information Retrieval 
DoD – Department of Defense 
DSCS III - Defense Satellite 
Communications System III 
DSP - Defense Support Program 
EELV - Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle 
EPS - Enhanced Polar System 
GAO – Government Accountability Office 
GPS III - Global Positioning System 
GPS Blk IIR - Global Positioning System 
GPS UE – Global Positioning System User 
Equipment 
IOC – Initial Operational Capability 
LCMC - Life Cycle Management Center 
MDAP - Major Defense Acquisition 
Program 
MS B – Milestone B 
MUOS - Mobile User Objective System 
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
NRO - National Reconnaissance Office 
NSS - National Security Strategy 
OCTL - Open Commitment plus 
Termination Liability 
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense 
RAND - Research ANd Development 
RDT&E - Research, Development, Training 
& Evaluation 
SAF/AQXE - Office of the Deputy Asst 
Secy for Acquisition Integration, Execution 
Oversight 
SAF/FMBI - Office of the Deputy Asst Secy 
for Acquisition Integration, Budget 
Investment 
SAR – Selected Acquisition Report 
SBIRS HI - Space-Based Infrared System Hi 
SMC - Space and Missile Systems Center 
TOA - Total Obligational Authority 
TY – Then Year 
UFR - Unfunded Requirements 
USCM - Unmanned Space Cost Model 
WBS – Work Breakdown Structure 
WGS - Wideband Global SATCOM 
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